Coordinating contracts are sometimes difficult to be established because of information sharing constraints and additional administrative burdens. Considering the difficulties of coordinating contracts, it is reasonable that coordination between only some of chain members will be easier to achieve than coordination of the whole supply chain. For convenience, coordination between only some of chain members is referred to sub-coordination. This paper discusses three types of sub-coordination in a competing supply chain comprising two manufacturers, a retailer, and a 3PL provider. Using the fully decentralized supply chain as a benchmark, the effects of sub-coordination on the supply chain are investigated. We find out that sub-coordination is not always effective to improve the profit of the supply chain, in some cases sub-coordination even does harm to supply chain members or the whole supply chain. The performance of sub-coordination critically depends on the degree of product substitutability.
I. INTRODUCTION
A supply chain is a complex network comprising multiple members. The contradiction of different objectives always leads to the loss of the profits, therefore, the channel coordination mechanisms are used to improve the supply chain performance. Different coordinating contracts have been proposed in the literature, including buy-back contracts [1] - [3] , quantity discount contracts [4] - [7] , quantity flexibility contracts [8] - [11] , and revenue-sharing contracts [12] - [16] . Although coordinating contracts can increase the profit of the whole supply chain, however, coordinating contracts are sometimes difficult to be established due to information sharing constraints and additional administrative burdens. For example, Cachon and Lariviere pointed out the limitations of using revenue-sharing contracts. They identified three limitations that prevent revenue sharing emerging in every industry, and one of the most significant limitations is the administrative burden. Under revenue sharing, the supplier must monitor the revenues of retailer to verify that they are split appropriately [17] . Considering the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Vijay Mago . difficulties of coordinating contracts, it is reasonable that coordination between only some of chain members will be easier to achieve than coordination of the whole supply chain. For convenience, coordination between only some of chain members is referred to sub-coordination. Seifert explained sub-coordination in detail and pointed out the importance of sub-coordination to the supply chain [18] . Different from the study of Seifert, we discuss sub-coordination in a competing supply chain with a 3PL provider Most of the existing literature addresses coordination problems in a supply chain without a 3PL provider [19] - [22] . However, in reality, many firms use the logistics service of the 3PL provider, and the 3PL provider plays a key role in managing the whole supply chain [23] . The study on the 3PL provider is evolving rapidly [24] - [29] . It should be noted that the price of the 3PL provider will cause well known double marginalization, which destroys the profit of the whole supply chain. It is better that supply chain coordination should involve the 3PL provider. In order to mitigate double marginalization caused by the 3PL provider, some coordination contracts could be used.
Our work is also related to previous research on the competing supply chain. There are many substitutable products in market, for example, Dell and HP in computer market, GM and Ford in auto industry. In recent years, the competing channel structure has been of growing interest to academicians [30] - [33] . This paper considers a competing supply chain (see Fig.1 ) comprising two manufacturers (denoted by M 1 and M 2 ), a 3PL provider (denoted by L), and a retailer (denoted by R). Each manufacturer produces only one product, which is a substitute for the other manufacturer's product. The two manufacturers sell the substitutable products to the common retailer through the logistics service of the 3PL provider.
In this paper, the optimal decision of the fully decentralized system is first characterized and it is used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of sub-coordination. Furthermore, we discuss three types of sub-coordination. The first one is the coordination only between the retailer and the 3PL provider, simplified by R-L coordination. The second one is the coordination only between the manufacturers and the 3PL provider, simplified by M-L coordination. The third one is the coordination only between the manufacturers and the retailer, simplified by M-R coordination. The sub-coordination mentioned above could be achieved by a coordinating contract, or by having a single decision maker who owns all the decision powers. Two main questions are raised in this paper:
(1) How sub-coordination affects the performance of the supply chain, and under what conditions some of them are willing to form sub-coordination. (2) How competition between the two manufacturers affects the performance of sub-coordination, whether the performance of sub-coordination depends on the degree of product substitutability. Our main contributions are as below. (1) We combine the competing supply chain with the 3PL provider, and propose a generalization of previous models and approaches.
(2) Considering the difficulties of coordinating contracts for all members, we devise three types of sub-coordination which are easier to achieve than coordination of the whole supply chain. The efficiency of sub-coordination is discussed.
II. THE MODEL
Following previous literature [34] - [40] , we assume that the demand of product i is decreasing in its own retail price and increasing in that of the competitor. The demand function is given by
where p i denotes the product i's retail price, Q 0 (Q 0 > 0) denotes the demand when the prices of two products are zero, α(α > 0) denotes the parameter that influences consumer sensitivity to retail price, and β(β > 0) denotes the sensitivity of product i 's sale to change in product j's retail price. We assume α > β, which is reasonable because the demand for product is more sensitive to its own retail price than that of the competitor. Inhere α and β capture the product differentiation, and ρ = β/α is related to the degree of product substitutability, that is, the greater β/α, the more substitutable it is. c M denotes the manufacturer's unit manufacturing cost. Following previous literature, we assume that the manufacturing costs of two manufacturers are the same. c L denotes the 3PL provider's unit operational cost. c R denotes the retailer's unit retail cost. We let c = c M + c L + c R . The decision variable w i denotes the product i's wholesale price charged by manufacturer i to the retailer. The decision variable m denotes the logistics service price charged by the 3PL provider to the retailer. All data is assumed to be common knowledge.
III. THE FULLY DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN
The sequence of events taking place within the decentralized system is as follows. 
The profit function of the whole supply chain is
The model is solved through backwards induction. Given w 1 , w 2 and m, the retailer determines p 1 and p 2 to maximize its profit as given in (5) . According to the first-order conditions ∂ R /∂p 1 = 0, ∂ R /∂p 2 = 0, the best reaction functions of the retailer are Given w 1 and w 2 , the 3PL provider determines m to maximize its profit as given in (4) . Substituting (7) into (4), and applying the first-order condition ∂ L /∂m = 0 to the resulting profit function, the best reaction function of the 3PL provider is
Substituting (8) into (7) , (7) is rewritten as
The manufacturer i uses the best reaction functions of the 3PL provider and the retailer to determine w i to maximize its profit. Substituting (9) into (2) and (3), respectively, and applying the first-order conditions ∂ M 1 /∂w 1 = 0, ∂ M 2 /∂w 2 = 0 gives the optimal wholesale prices w * 1 and w * 2 . Hence, the optimal prices and profits of chain members are obtained by substituting w * 1 and w * 2 into corresponding equalities. The optimal results are reported in Table 1 .
IV. SUB-COORDINATION IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
In this section, three types of sub-coordination, i.e., the R-L coordination, the M-L coordination, and the M-R coordination, are discussed. The present model focuses to show the impact of sub-coordination on the supply chain using the fully decentralized supply chain as a benchmark. Comparing the optimal results under the sub-coordination with those under the fully decentralized supply chain, we aim to analyze whether the double marginalization is partly mitigated by the sub-coordination, and whether the sub-coordination is always effective to improve the profit of the supply chain.
A. R-L COORDINATION
The coordination only between the retailer and the 3PL provider can be achieved by two ways. The first one is that a flexible coordinating contract is established between the retailer and the 3PL provider [39] . The flexible coordinating contract means that they just set the rules of pricing while postponing the determination of the final contract prices, all they need to do is to declare that m and p i will be determined based on the following rules: for given w i ,
. ϕ implies the profit division between the retailer and the 3PL provider. Such a coordinating contract ensures that the retailer and the 3PL provider are always fully coordinated no matter what contract the manufacturers and the retailer agree on. The second one is that the retailer and the 3PL provider are owned by a firm, for example, the retailer can ship the products to the destination market with its own transportation fleet, warehouse and so on. When the retailer and the 3PL provider form the R-L coordination, the coordinated retailer-3PL provider decides p 1 and p 2 to maximize its total profits considering the logistics service price m as an interior payment. The coordinated retailer-3PL provider's profit function RL R,L , manufacturer 1's profit function RL M 1 , manufacturer 2's profit function RL M 2 can be expressed as
The sequence of events taking place within this system is as follows. (1) The Manufacturer i determines the wholesale price w i to the coordinated retailer-3PL provider. (2) The coordinated retailer-3PL provider ships the products to the destination market and determines retail prices p 1 and p 2 to the customers. Similar to Section 4, the optimal prices and profits of chain members are obtained. The optimal results are reported in Table 2 .
Note that the degree of product substitutability is related to ρ, i.e., as ρ approaches 1, the two products become more substitutable. Most of the existing literature on the competing supply chain is concerned with the effects of the parameter ρ on supply chain performance. Thus, it is necessary to discuss that how sub-coordination affects the supply chain under different degrees of product substitutability.
Proposition 1: Comparing the optimal profits, the effects of the R-L coordination on the chain members under different degrees of product substitutability are given by the following:
(1) If ρ satisfies Fig.2 (A) . For comparative purposes, the profit improvement of the coordinated retailer-3PL provider is defined as 1 
. 1 involves only the parameter ρ, the trend of 1 over the range of product substitutability, as shown in Fig.2 
For comparative purposes, the profit improvements of the manufacturers and the whole supply chain are defined as 2 = ( RL * M 1 − * M 1 )/ * M 1 and 3 = ( RL * T − * T )/ * T , respectively. 2 and 3 involve only the parameter ρ, the trend of 2 and 3 over the range of product substitutability are shown in Fig.2 (C) and (d), respectively. Proposition 1 shows that the performance of the R-L coordination critically depends on the degree of product substitutability. If the degree of product substitutability is high, i.e., 0.56 ≤ ρ < 1, the retailer and the 3PL provider would have incentives to form the R-L coordination and their total profits will increase. Moreover, 1 is increasing in ρ (see Fig.2 (B) ), that is, the more substitutable the two products become, the better the retailer and the 3PL provider form the R-L coordination. Fig.2 (B) also reveals that as ρ approaches 1, 1 approaches 0.33, i.e. the profit of the coordinated retailer-3PL provider could increase by so far as to 33%. On the contrary, if the degree of product substitutability is low, i.e., 0 < ρ < 0.56, the incentives for the retailer and the 3PL provider to form the R-L coordination disappear. Proposition 1 also shows that when the R-L coordination is formed, the profits of the two manufacturers and the whole supply chain will increase. Moreover, 2 is increasing in ρ and 1.08 < 2 < 3.0 (see Fig.2 (C)), i.e., the more substitutable the two products become, the greater the profit improvement of the manufacturers will be. The profit of the manufacturers could increase by 108% to 300% over the range of product substitutability. The two manufacturers greatly benefit from the R-L coordination and they will be very glad to see that the R-L coordination is formed. To the whole supply chain, the efficiency of the R-L coordination is greater than that of the decentralized supply chain. The double marginalization is partly mitigated by the coordination between the retailer and the 3PL provider. Moreover, 3 is decreasing in ρ and 0.33 < 3 < 0.47 (see Fig.2 (D)), i.e., the more substitutable the two products become, the worse the efficiency of the R-L coordination will be, and the profit of the whole supply chain could increase by 33% to 47% over the range of product substitutability.
B. M-L COORDINATION
The coordination only between the manufacturers and the 3PL provider can be achieved by two ways. The first one is that a flexible coordinating contract is established between the manufacturers and the 3PL provider. All they need to do is to declare that the logistics service price m and the wholesale price w i will be determined based on the following expression between the manufacturers and the 3PL provider. Such a coordinating contract ensures that the manufacturers and the 3PL provider are always fully coordinated no matter what contract the 3PL provider and the retailer agree on. The second one is that the manufacturers ship the products to the destination market with their own transportation fleet, warehouse, and so on. When the manufacturers and the 3PL provider form the M-L coordination, the coordinated manufacturers-3PL provider decides w 1 + m and w 2 + m to maximize its total profits. The coordinated manufacturers-3PL provider's profit function ML M 1,M 2,L , the retailer's profit function ML R can be expressed as
Similar to Section 4, the optimal prices and profits of the chain members are obtained. The optimal results are reported in Table 3 .
Proposition 2:
Comparing the optimal profits, the effects of the M-L coordination on the chain members under different degrees of product substitutability are given by the following:
(1) ML * Fig.3(C) . For comparative purposes, the profit improvement of the entire supply chain is defined as 6 involves only the parameter ρ, the trend of 6 over the range of product substitutability is shown in Fig.3 (D) . Proposition 2 shows that if the manufacturers and the 3PL provider form the M-L coordination, their total profits will decrease and they would prefer to act alone rather than to coordinate with each other. Moreover, the loss rate | 4 | is increasing in ρ (see Fig.3 (A) ), that is, the more substitutable the two products become, the worse the manufacturers and the 3PL provider form the M-L coordination, and they will be more interested in acting alone. Fig.3 (A) also reveals that 0.41 < | 4 | < 1, i.e., the profit of the coordinated manufacturers-3PL provider could decrease by 41% to 100% over the range of product substitutability. To the retailer, when the M-L coordination is formed, the profit of the retailer will increase. Moreover, 5 is increasing in ρ and 1.78 < 5 < 3 (see Fig.3 (B) ), i.e., the more substitutable the two products become, the greater the profit improvement of the retailer will be. The profit of the retailer could increase by 178% to 300% over the range of product substitutability. To the entire supply chain, the efficiency of the M-L coordination depends on the degree of product substitutability. If the degree of product substitutability is very low, i.e., 0 < ρ < 0.2, the M-L coordination enables the profit of the whole supply chain to decrease, and the profit could decrease by 2% at most. On the contrary, if 0.2 ≤ ρ < 1, the M-L coordination enables the profit of the whole supply chain to increase, and the profit could increase by 33% at most.
C. M-R COORDINATION
The coordination only between the manufacturers and the retailer can be achieved by two ways. The first one is that a flexible coordinating contract is established between the manufacturers and the retailer. All they need to do is to declare that the wholesale price w i and the retail price p i will be determined based on the following expression: for given
. ϕ implies the profit division between the manufacturers and the retailer. Such a coordinating contract ensures that the manufacturers and the retailer are always fully coordinated no matter what contract the 3PL provider and the retailer agree on. The second one is that the manufacturers distribute products through their wholly owned retail channel, such as the online channel. When the manufacturers and the retailer form the M-R coordination, the coordinated manufacturers-retailer decides p 1 and p 2 to maximize its total profits considering the wholesale prices w 1 and w 2 as interior payments. The coordinated manufacturers-retailer's profit function MR M 1,M 2,R , the 3PL provider's profit function MR L can be expressed as
Similar to Section 4, the optimal prices and profits of the chain members are obtained. The optimal results are reported in Table 4 . Proposition 3 shows that if the manufacturers and the retailer form the M-R coordination, their total profits will decrease and they would prefer to act alone rather than to coordinate with each other. Moreover, if 0.2 < ρ < 1, then | 7 | is decreasing in ρ, or else | 7 | is increasing in ρ. Proposition 3 also shows that the M-R coordination enables the profits of the 3PL provider and the entire supply chain to increase. Moreover, 8 is decreasing in ρ and 0 < 8 < 1.78 (see Fig.4 (B) ), i.e., the more substitutable the two products become, the less the 3PL provider's profit improvement will be, and the profit of the 3PL provider could increase by so far as to 178%. To the entire supply chain, 9 is decreasing in ρ and 0 < 9 < 0.47 (see Fig.4 (C) ), i.e., the more substitutable the two products become, the worse the efficiency of the M-R coordination will be, and the profit of entire supply chain could increase by so far as to 47%.
D. ANALYSIS OF THREE TYPES OF SUB-COORDINATION
We proceed to analyze the equilibrium results derived in the previous section. In this study, we focus on the effects of three types of sub-coordination on the retailer's order quantities and the total profits of the entire supply chain. We show clearly which one is the best among three types of subcoordination.
Proposition 4: The ordinal relationship of the retailer's order quantities at equilibrium under three types of sub-coordination is given below
. Proposition 4 indicates that three types of sub-coordination enable the retailer's order quantities to increase compared to the fully decentralized system, and RL q * 1 = RL q * 2 = ML q * 1 = ML q * 2 implies that no matter what party the 3PL provider chooses to form sub-coordination with, the retailer's order quantities do not change. Among three types of subcoordination, the retailer's order quantities under the R-L (or the M-L) coordination are the largest.
Proposition 5: Comparing the optimal profits of the entire supply chain, as summarized in the last ranks of Tables 1 to 4, we find out that T . Proposition 5 indicates that the effects of three types of sub-coordination on the total profits of the supply chain critically depend on the degree of product substitutability. For all 0 < ρ < 1, the profit of the supply chain under the R-L coordination is the largest, i.e., the best choice for the entire supply chain is to let the retailer and the 3PL provider form sub-coordination. If 0.67 < ρ < 1, no matter what party the manufacturers chooses to form sub-coordination with, the total supply chain profits will increase compared to the fully decentralized system, however, from the point of view of the whole supply chain's profit, it is better for the manufacturers to choose to form sub-coordination with the 3PL provider rather than to form sub-coordination with the retailer. If 0.2 < ρ ≤ 0.67, no matter what party the manufacturers chooses to form sub-coordination with, the total supply chain profits will increase compared to the fully decentralized system, however, from the point of view of the whole supply chain's profit, it is better for the manufacturers to choose to form sub-coordination with the retailer. If 0 < ρ ≤ 0.2, the M-L coordination is the worst, it's performance is even less than that in fully decentralized system.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section discusses the effects of sub-coordination on the supply chain through a numerical example. The demand function q i = 125 − 13p i + 3.5p j . The manufacturer's cost c M = 10, the 3PL provider's cost c L = 6.5, the retailer's cost c R = 6. Under the fully decentralized system, the optimal prices and profits of chain members are 
A. CASE 1
We examine the effects of sub-coordination on the profits of chain members. When the retailer and the 3PL provider form the R-L coordination, the profit of the coordinated retailer-3PL provider decreases by 6.8%, the profits of the manufacturers increase by 128.5%, the profit of the entire supply chain increases by 43.7%. When the manufacturers and the 3PL provider form the M-L coordination, the profit of the coordinated manufacturers-3PL provider decreases by 46.1%, the profit of the retailer increases by 179.6%, the profit of the entire supply chain increases by 1.1%. When the manufacturers and the retailer form the M-R coordination, the profit of the coordinated manufacturers-retailer decreases by 24.9%, the profit the 3PL provider increases by 109.4%, the profit of the entire supply chain increases by 31.2%. 
B. CASE 2
We examine the effects of product substitutability on the chain members. The demand function q i = 125 − 13p i + βp j , where β changes from 5 to 12 at intervals of 1. The optimal prices and profits under the R-L coordination, the M-L coordination, and the M-R coordination are reported in Tables 5 to 7, respectively. Table 5 to 7 show that for a fixed α = 13, when β → α, all the equilibrium prices are increasing in β and all the equilibrium profits display a trend of U Curve, i.e., they are decreasing in β and then increasing in β.
C. CASE 3
The effects of product substitutability on the total profits of the supply chain under different types of sub-coordination are examined. The demand function q i = 125−αp i +βp j , where ρ = β/α changes from 0 to 1. The profit improvements of the entire supply chain under the M-L coordination, the R-L coordination and the M-R coordination are shown in Fig.5 . Fig.5 shows that the R-L coordination is the best among three types of sub-coordination, and if 0 < ρ ≤ 0.67, the M-R coordination is better than the M-L coordination, if 0.67 < ρ < 1, the M-L coordination is better than the M-R coordination.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated sub-coordination in a competing supply chain consisting of two manufacturers, a 3PL provider, and a retailer. Considering the difficulties of coordinating contracts for all members, three types of sub-coordination are explored. The conditions for some of them are willing to form sub-coordination and the effects of different types of sub-coordination on the supply chain are discussed. We find out that the effects critically depend on the degree of product substitutability. If the degree of product substitutability is high, the retailer and the 3PL provider would have incentives to form the R-L coordination and their total profits will increase. On the contrary, if the degree of product substitutability is low, the incentives for the retailer and the 3PL provider to form the R-L coordination disappear. Both the retailer and the 3PL provider would prefer to act alone rather than to coordinate with the manufacturers. From the point of view of the whole supply chain's profit, it is better to let the retailer and the 3PL provider form sub-coordination.
Our results provide some suggestions to managers and help them make better decisions. According to our results, sub-coordination is not always effective to improve the profit of the supply chain. To our surprise, in some cases sub-coordination even does harm to supply chain members or the whole supply chain. The performance of sub-coordination critically depends on the degree of product substitutability, managers should decide that whether or not form the subcoordination and what kind of sub-coordination according to different degrees of product substitutability. If the degree of product substitutability is high, then R-L coordination is the best choice for the managers. If the degree of product substitutability is very low, it is better for the managers to choose not to coordinate with other chain members.
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